Another Drone. Another Visual Sighting. And Still No Complete Picture.
Irish Defence Forces Veterans News has raised this issue before.
Who guards the skies over Ireland?
More importantly, who can actually see what is in them?
This week that question returned again after a commercial pilot approaching Dublin reported seeing what was described as a large unidentified drone off the Wicklow coast.
Not a military radar.
Not a national air-defence surveillance system.
Not some sophisticated national sensor network.
A pilot looking out of an aircraft window.
That point matters.
The sighting was reported through the aviation system and investigated, but the object was described by Government as “unverified”.
That is understandable. No responsible Minister should identify an object without evidence.
But there is another side to the word unverified.
How exactly is Ireland supposed to rapidly verify these incidents when the State still does not possess the full long-range military radar capability needed to build a recognised air picture across Irish airspace and its maritime approaches?
The Government cannot reasonably have it both ways.
We cannot repeatedly describe sightings as unverified while still lacking some of the equipment required to verify them.
The long-range military radar programme is progressing, but the first systems are not expected until 2027, with full capability later.
That means that in September 2026, during Ireland’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the State still does not possess the complete military radar coverage which has been discussed for years.
To be fair, Government has moved on counter-drone capability.
Around €19 million has been committed to counter-UAS systems, including SkyWarden technology, while the Defence Forces have also developed additional measures involving electronic warfare, detection and interception.
These are important improvements.
But a counter-drone bubble around a specific location is not the same thing as being able to see and understand what is operating across Irish airspace.
Counter-drone capability is not a substitute for a national recognised air picture.
And this is where the joined-up thinking still appears weak.
Ireland knew years in advance that it would hold the EU Presidency.
Government knew foreign leaders and senior officials would be travelling here.
Government knew drone threats were increasing across Europe.
Government knew Ireland had no military primary radar.
And after earlier drone incidents, Government knew the threat was no longer theoretical.
Yet major elements of Ireland’s air-defence capability are still being developed while the Presidency is already under way.
Now, following the Wicklow sighting, Taoiseach Micheál Martin has confirmed that additional offshore counter-drone capability is being pursued.
Again, that is welcome.
But it also shows how quickly the requirement is expanding.
First radar.
Then counter-UAS.
Then protection of Casement Aerodrome.
Then maritime surveillance.
Now offshore counter-drone technology.
Each individual measure makes sense.
The real question is whether Government is joining all of this together into one coherent national air and maritime defence strategy.
Because national defence cannot simply be a series of responses to the last incident.
This is not criticism of the Defence Forces.
They can only operate the systems the State gives them.
If Ireland wants radar operators, counter-drone teams, intelligence analysts, maritime surveillance crews and air-defence specialists, then those people must also be recruited, trained and retained.
Buying the equipment is only half the job.
The Commission on the Defence Forces reported in 2022.
Four years later, the EU Presidency is under way and a large unidentified drone sighting has again brought us back to the same basic question:
Who is watching Ireland’s skies?
This incident did not prove Ireland was attacked.
It proved something more basic.
We still do not always know what is above us.
And in 2026, that should concern everyone.